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Contents of Volume 35

Number 1, February 1985

Zvi Ritz. Restricted Domains, Arrow Social Welfare Functions and Noncorruptible and Nonmanipulable Social Choice Correspondences: The Case of Private and Public Alternatives 1

Kenneth L. Judd. The Law of Large Numbers with a Continuum of IID Random Variables 19

Mark Feldman and Christian Gilles. An Expository Note on Individual Risk without Aggregate Uncertainty 26

Chi-fu Huang. Information Structure and Equilibrium Asset Prices 33

William Novshek. Perfectly Competitive Markets as the Limits of Cournot Markets 72

John P. Laitner. Stationary Equilibrium Transition Rules for an Overlapping Generations Model with Uncertainty 83

R. Robert Russell. Measures of Technical Efficiency 109

Steven R. Williams. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Existence of a Locally Stable Message Process 127

Kiminori Matsuyama. Chernoff's Dual Axiom, Revealed Preference and Weak Rational Choice Functions 155

Notes, Comments, and Letters to the Editor

Hidesuke Okuda and Benyamin Shitovitz. Core Allocations and the Dimension of the Cone of Efficiency Price Vectors 166

Edi Karni. Increasing Risk with State-Dependent Preferences 172

Shlomo Weber and Shmuel Zamir. Proportional Taxation: Nonexistence of Stable Structures in an Economy with a Public Good 178

Takao Fujimoto. Stability of Nonlinear Homogeneous Difference Equations 186

Anat R. Admati and Paul Pfleiderer. Interpreting the Factor Risk Premia in the Arbitrage Pricing Theory 191

Corrigendum

Volume 25, Number 1, August 1981: J. F. Reinganum, "Dynamic Games of Innovation," pp. 21–41 196

Announcement 198

Papers to Appear in Forthcoming Issues 199

S. RAO AIYAGARI. Observational Equivalence of the Overlapping Generations and the Discounted Dynamic Programming Frameworks for One-Sector Growth 201
THEODORE C. BERGSTROM AND HAL R. VARIAN. When Do Market Games Have Transferable Utility? 222
DALE O. STAHL II AND MICHAEL ALEXEEV. The Influence of Black Markets on a Queue-Rationed Centrally Planned Economy 234
STEPHEN E. SPEAR. Rational Expectations in the Overlapping Generations Model 251
GIACOMO BONANNO AND E. CHRISTOPHER ZEEMAN. Limited Knowledge of Demand and Oligopoly Equilibria 276
JESS BENHABIB AND KAZUO NISHIMURA. Competitive Equilibrium Cycles 284
A. AL-NOWAIHI AND P. L. LEVINE. The Stability of the Cournot Oligopoly Model: A Reassessment 307
SUDHAKAR D. DESHMUKH AND STANLEY R. PLISKA. A Martingale Characterization of the Price of a Nonrenewable Resource with Decisions Involving Uncertainty 322
CHARLES KAHN AND JOSE SCHEINKMAN. Optimal Employment Contracts with Bankruptcy Constraints 343

NOTES, COMMENTS, AND LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

TARADAS BANDYOPADHYAY. Pareto Optimality and the Decisive Power Structure with Expansion Consistency Conditions 366
LARRY SAMUELSON. On the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives in Probabilistic Choice Models 376
JAMES W. FRIEDMAN. Cooperative Equilibria in Finite Horizon Noncooperative Supergames 390

CORRIGENDUM

Volume 27, Number 1, June 1982: S. M. Ravi Kanbur, "Increases in Risk with Kinked Payoff Functions," pp. 219–228 399

ANNOUNCEMENT 400
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 402
PAPERS TO APPEAR IN FORTHCOMING ISSUES 404
AUTHOR INDEX FOR VOLUME 35 406